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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
All issues presented arise from the Ruling denying Appellant's Motion to
Set Aside Decree of Divorce issued by the Honorable Paul D. Lyman of the Sixth
District Court. Thus, all issues were preserved for appeal.
1. Issue number 1. Whether the trial court properly issued a default
judgment and decree of divorce against Appellant/Respondent Korrin
Peterson as a sanction for failure to respond to discovery. This is
reviewed under a clear abuse of discretion standard. Morton v.
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997).
2. Issue no. 2.

Whether the trial court abused it's discretion when it

denied Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside the default decree of
Divorce. This is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92.
RELEVANT RULES
Utah R. Civ. P. 60 (b) Relief from Judgment or order:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud,
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for
fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Utah R. Civ. Pro. 104. Divorce decree upon affidavit:
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a hearing in
cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely appearance after service
of process or other appropriate notice, waives notice, stipulates to the withdrawal
of the answer, or stipulates to the entry of the decree or entry of default. An
affidavit in support of the decree shall accompany the application. The affidavit
shall contain evidence sufficient to support necessary findings of fact and a final
judgment.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c). Default.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry
of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside
in accordance with Rule 60(b).
Utah R. Civ. Pro 6(d). Time:
(d) Notice of hearings. Notice of a hearing shall be served not later than 5 days
before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by these
rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex
parte application.
Utah R. App. Procedure. 24(a)(9) Briefs
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing

any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking
to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and
set forth the legal basis for such an award.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
This case is a divorce proceeding, begun by Appellee/Petitioner Van O.
Peterson versus his former wife, Appellant/Respondent Korrin Peterson via a
verified complaint. R. 1-9. The Honorable Paul D. Lyman eventually granted
Appellee a default Divorce as a sanction against Korrin Peterson for her failure to
reply to discovery requests.
Discovery was first served on March 3, 2004. R. 34-35. Korrin's prior
counsel withdrew in April of 2004. R.40-41. It was after that date that Korrin
Peterson was served with a motion to compel (R. 42-43), and a hearing was held
on June 4th, 2004, at which both parties were present. R. 75.
At that hearing, held in July of 2004, the trial court set a new discovery
deadline, and required the Appellee, Van Peterson, to reserve his discovery
requests, which Van Peterson did. Id. The trial court specifically warned Korrin
Peterson that if she failed to comply with the discovery, affirmative action would
be taken. Id. Korrin Peterson failed to complete the discovery by the deadline in
June. Finally, in September of 2004, Appellee Van Peterson moved for sanctions
and a default decree of divorce. R. 83-86. Korrin Peterson failed to reply to that
motion as well. The trial court, upon receiving the notice to submit, set the date

for an evidentiary hearing, and mailed notice to Korrin Peterson. R. 90-91. The
trial court was convinced that she received that notice, and chose to ignore it and
not attend the hearing. R. 247-248. She had actual notice of this hearing and
chose to ignore it. R. 224-233.
After that hearing, Korrin Peterson hired new counsel, who promptly filed
an objection to the proposed findings of fact and the decree of divorce that resulted
from the evidentiary hearing. R. 96-101. The trial court carefully considered
these objections, but ultimately denied them, R. 119-121, and issued his Findings
of fact and the decree of divorce. R. 122-140. Korrin Peterson then made a Rule
60 Motion to set aside the decree, R. 151-195, which the trial court denied, R. 247248. and she now has appealed to this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are two main issues in this case. First, Appellee/Petitioner Van
Peterson argues that the trial court properly issued a default divorce decree as a
sanction for Appellant/Respondent's Korrin Peterson's failure to respond to
discovery requests. It appears that this is not in dispute.
Second, Appellee Van Peterson argues that the trial court did not abuse it's
discretion when it refused to set aside the default divorce decree. Any alleged
procedural defect was harmless, since Appellant Korrin Peterson did not suffer
any harm and was completely heard on the issues before the trial court. And any

mistake, fraud, ineffective assistance of counsel, excusable neglect, and limited
findings of fact are irrelevant to the central question of whether the court properly
issued the default divorce. Thus, the trial court did not abuse it's discretion in
refusing to set aside the default divorce.
Appellee also requests that Appellant Korrin Peterson's Exhibit "G" be
struck, as it is not in the record. It purports to be a transcript of the evidentiary
hearing held in this case, but Appellant has certified no transcript is required.
Also, Appellee asks for their attorney fees.

ARGUMENT
The basic issue in this appeal whether the trial court correctly issued a
default decree of divorce as a sanction, and whether the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to set it aside. Appellee agrees with Appellant that the
standard of review is that of whether the trial court abused it's discretion when it
refused to set aside the default divorce decree.
As a threshold matter, Appellant Korrin Peterson has failed to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial courts decision, as required by Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9).
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THE TRIAL COURT'S SANCTION OF A DEFAULT

JUDGMENT WAS PROPER,
Appellant Korrin Peterson alleges that sanctioning her for her failure to
comply with discovery by issuing a default judgment was a harsh remedy. This
Court Just this year, in Coxey v. Foe, Aerie No. 2742, 2005 UT App. 185 made it
clear that default judgments are an accepted sanction, at the discretion of the trial
court. In Coxey, this Court held that "Before the court imposes discovery
sanctions under rule 37, it 'must find on the part of the noncomplying party,
willfulness, bad faith, or fault/" Id. at «[ 4 (citation omitted). Willfulness is later
defined as any intentional failure to disclose. Id. at f 6. In this case, Appellant
Korrin Peterson admits she failed to disclose because of various reasons, including
negotiations. This failure was therefore willful, and sanctions are perfectly
appropriate.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION

WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT DECREE OF
DIVORCE
The decree of divorce in this case was issued as a sanction for failing to
comply with discovery rules. This is not in question. Indeed, it does not appear
that Appellant Korrin Peterson has ever contested that. She makes several
arguments that the trial court failed to consider her complaints about the default

divorce decree, such as fraud, mistake, excusable neglect, insufficient findings of
fact, and ineffective assistance of counsel. She also argues that the notice of the
evidentiary hearing was procedurally ineffective.

A. There was sufficient due process to issue a default
divorce decree
Appellant Korrin Peterson argues that the Honorable Trial Judge abused his
discretion by denying Appellant's motion for relief under Utah R. Civ. Pro. 60.
This is a high burden to meet.
Her argument is basically a question of timing—whether the trial court
granted her procedurally sufficient notice of the Evidentiary Hearing. She cites to
Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its five days notice
requirements for hearings, and claims she only received 2 days of effective notice.
The trial court clearly believed that she had received actual notice, and simply
chose not to come. R. 247-248. This is supported by ample evidence, which
Appellant Korrin Peterson has not addressed at all. See, Affidavit of Van O.
Peterson, R. 224-230; and Affidavit of Katrina Lyon, R. 231-233.
The first question to ask is whether she was entitled to notice of the
evidentiary hearing at all. While Rule 6 does require notice of hearings, at the
time of the hearing, Korrin Peterson was in default. She had not opposed the
motion for default, which the trial court found she had received notice of. R. 247-
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248. This state of default was a sanction for her failure to provide discoveiy. This
is not in dispute.
In a divorce action, a decree can issue without a hearing if there is a default
judgment. Rule 104 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Rule 104. Divorce decree upon affidavit.
A party in a divorce case may apply for entry of a decree without a
hearing in cases in which the opposing party fails to make a timely
appearance after service of process or other appropriate notice, waives
notice, stipulates to the withdrawal of the answer, or stipulates to the
entry of the decree or entry of default. An affidavit in support of the
decree shall accompany the application. The affidavit shall contain
evidence sufficient to support necessary findings of fact and a final
judgment.

While not completely on point, it is clear that where one side does not
contest the divorce, there is no need for a hearing. Here, the trial court ended the
contested part of the divorce via sanction. Thus, there was no need of a hearing at
all. To hold otherwise would basically remove the effect of the sanction. If a
hearing is required, then what is the point of issuing a default decree as a sanction?
Under Korrin Peterson's view, she suffers no ill effects from her failure to provide
discovery, thus eviscerating the concept of sanctions at all.
In any case, even if the hearing was required, all that was discussed was
evidence, to which Korrin Peterson properly objected after the hearing to the
proposed findings of fact and decree of divorce. R. 96-101. If the trial court
committed error by not providing any notice to her of the evidentiary hearing, then
that error was cured by the subsequent objections, response, and reply, all of

w

which took place before the trial judge issued the decree of divorce on December
9th, 2004. Appellant Korrin Peterson cannot complain now that the trial court did
not consider her views of the evidence presented at the hearing, because the court
did. The purpose of the hearing was to provide evidence so as to enable the court
to issue the decree of the divorce. If Korrin Peterson was not there in person, she
still contested Van Peterson's evidence, so she was not at all harmed by any
alleged failures of notice. Thus, any denial of due process did not result in the
issuance of the default divorce—since Korrin Peterson's view was heard, just as
much as if she had attended the hearing.
She has not explained how she was harmed by the alleged failure to receive
notice of the hearing, when she properly objected to the parts of the divorce decree
and findings of fact she found objectionable. R. 96-101 and R. 112-118. The trial
judge considered her objections, so she was fully represented and thus suffered no
denial of due process that resulted in the issuance of a default divorce.
Further, if Appellant Korrin Peterson truly felt that the trial court issued the
entry of default without proper notice, the proper procedure would have been to
move to set aside the entry of default, as Utah Rule Civ. Pro. 55 (c) allows. This
she did not do, even after she had counsel.

B. Alleged Fraud, mistake, excusable neglect, limited
findings of facts, and ineffective assistance of counsel
do not justify relief
Most of these issues, even if Appellant Korrin Peterson is correct, do not
justify relief from the default decree of divorce. The Trial Court on June 4. 2004
ordered her to comply with the discovery requests in 20 days, (by June 24th, 2004)
or face "affirmative action." R. 75; 78-80. At that point in time, she was no longer
assisted by counsel, so it is hard to see how any prior counsel can be blamed for
her failure to comply by June 24th, 2004. Any alleged fraud by the Appellee, Van
Peterson, either upon the court or on the Appellant herself does not change the fact
that she was ordered to provide the discovery, and failed to do so. If nothing else,
when the motion for default was served on her (and the trial court was convinced
she received it), why did she not reply? She could have at least called the court or
something to check into the matter. There is no question that she received the
motion for default and had plenty of time to answer that motion. The trial court
found explicitly that she had received the motion (Ruling on Motion to Set Aside
Default Divorce, R. 247-248), and Appellant Korrin Peterson has failed to marshal
the evidence to challenge that finding. At the least, she could have written to the
court and asked what she needed to do.

As for mistake, the trial court basically found that Korrin Peterson, if she
was confused or didn't understand the law, should have asked the court for help.
R. 247-248. Instead, she did nothing.
With respect to excusable neglect, Appellant Korrin Peterson claims many
physical ailments prevented her from complying with the discovery requests.
However, according to her own statement of facts, all of these physical ailments
took place before the June 4th, 2004 hearing, where the trial court gave her more
time to comply with the discovery requests, and also ordered those requests to be
served on her again, which they were. R. 76-77. Thus, Appellant had ample
opportunity to comply with those requests, even after her treatments. As for
negotiations over any proposed stipulated divorce terms, negotiations do not
obviate the duty to comply with a court order; especially when a motion to compel
had been filed and the Court specifically had warned Appellant Korrin Peterson
that there could be affirmative consequences for her failure to comply. R. 78-80.
As for insufficient findings of fact, in this case it is clear that the facts at
issue have no relevance on whether the default decree was properly issued. Even
assuming Appellants versions of the facts she complains the Court did not make
sufficient findings on are true, and the Court had found them her way, they do not
justify relief. The issue is whether the Court could issue a default divorce decree
as a sanction for discovery, and none of the facts complained of bear on that, as
discussed supra.

III.

APPELLANTS EXHIBIT "G" SHOULD BE STRUCK.

Furthermore, the Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to strike Appellant
Korrin Peterson's Exhibit "G", the alleged transcript of the evidentiary hearing.
The Appellant prepared this "transcript"—not by a licensed court reporter or
someone else licensed to prepare transcripts. (Indeed, the alleged transcript refers
to a "Mr. Moody/' who is not at all involved in this case.) Nor has Appellant filed
a request for transcripts in this case; rather certifying that no transcripts are
required. R. 254-255. Thus5 Appellee Van Peterson asks this Court to Strike
Appellee's Exhibit "G."

CONCLUSION
The trial court properly issued the default judgment against Appellant
Korrin Peterson, and did not abuse it's discretion when it denied Appellants
motion to set aside the Default. Therefore, This Court should uphold the trial
courts denial of the Motion to set aside. Appellee Van Peterson also asks this
Court to strike Appellant's Exhibit "G," the alleged transcript of the evidentiary
hearing, as it is not a proper transcript, nor prepared by a person certified to
prepare transcripts, and Appellant certified that no transcript was required.
Appellee also asks for their attorney fees, as they prevailed below.
DATED t h i s ^ P d a y of November, 2005
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